Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale by Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
By Rod Garratt and Thomas Tr oger¤
May 20, 2004
Abstract
We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called
speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric independent private
values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria
with active resale markets and positive proﬁts for a speculator. In
ﬁrst-price/Dutch auctions, the unique equilibrium can involve an active
resale market, but is never proﬁtable for a speculator. In all standard
auctions, allowing resale can increase the initial seller’s revenue and
lead to an ineﬃcient allocation. First-price and second-price auctions
are not revenue equivalent.




Open English auctions and sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auctions are among the
most widely used sales mechanisms, historically and currently, with appli-
cations ranging from sales of used comic books on eBay to sales of govern-
ment contracts worth billions of dollars. Beginning with Vickrey (1961), a
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1tremendous amount of research eﬀort has focused on the strategic proper-
ties of these standard auctions, including the related second-price and Dutch
auctions (see Klemperer’s 1999 survey). The most fundamental results are
that standard auctions allocate a good eﬃciently and yield identical rev-
enues, provided the bidders are symmetric, have independent private values
(SIPV), and there is no resale. In practice, however, active resale mar-
kets are common. Yet, relatively little is known about the strategic and
economic properties of auctions with resale. Meanwhile, standard auction
formats continue to be used without a full understanding of the implications
of resale opportunities.
This paper shows that resale opportunities dramatically change the prop-
erties of standard auctions with SIPV buyers. In particular, we explore the
role created by resale opportunities for bidders who have no consumption
value for the goods in the market. Because such bidders buy solely in order
to resell, we call them speculators. It is hard to argue that a model without
speculators can be a complete description of a market with resale.
We consider a 2-period interaction. In period 1, the good is oﬀered via
a standard auction without a reserve price to SIPV buyers and a speculator
(the results remain valid if multiple speculators can enter and, with some
qualiﬁcations, if the auction is augmented by a reserve price). The winner
of the auction either consumes the good or puts it up for resale in period 2.
The period-2 seller chooses a resale mechanism that maximizes her expected
period-2 payoﬀ given her posterior beliefs about the market; in particular,
the period-2 seller has full bargaining power in the resale market.1 No new
bidders arrive after period 1, and no information becomes public beyond
what is revealed via bids. Because our focus is on the speculator, we restrict
attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria that are symmetric across the SIPV
buyers. We determine all such equilibria, modulo a monotonicity and a
participation restriction.
We derive results for English/second-price auctions and ﬁrst-price/Dutch
auctions. Concerning the English/second-price auction, we show that—
while bid-your-value remains an equilibrium outcome—the resale opportu-
nity creates a continuum of new equilibria (in undominated strategies) with
active resale markets. For every q 2 (0;1], we construct an equilibrium such
that the speculator wins the auction with probability q. All these equilibria
are proﬁtable for the speculator. Because the speculator keeps the good
1Wilson (1987, p. 36-37) stresses the practicality and robustness of detail-free standard
auction mechanisms. However, factors that make standard auctions appropriate for the
initial seller will not deter bidders, who are well-informed market traders, from using
optimal resale mechanisms.
2with positive probability, none of the equilibria yields an eﬃcient allocation.
The key to understanding the English/second-price auction equilibria is
that bid-your-value is not part of a dominant strategy when resale is possible.
A buyer may want to reduce her chances to win in period 1 because she
expects a lower price in period 2. In the equilibria we construct, low-value
buyers pool at a bid of 0 in period 1 (which can be interpreted as abstaining
from the auction). This allows the speculator to win the auction and get
the good for free. The speculator’s bid is higher than her resale price, in
order to make it optimal for low-value buyers to wait for resale.
The ﬁrst-price/Dutch auction results are quite diﬀerent from the En-
glish/ second-price auction results. The equilibrium is always unique, and
never proﬁtable for the speculator. This is not to say that the specula-
tor never becomes active. For any number of buyers in the market, there
are examples of value distributions with increasing hazard rate such that
the bidding competition among buyers is so weak that the speculator is
attracted. In equilibrium buyers increase their bids until the speculator’s
payoﬀ is driven down to zero, while the speculator randomizes her bid in
a way that makes the buyers’ increased bids optimal. Whenever the equi-
librium is such that the speculator becomes active, there is delay and a
probability of misallocation. Hence, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
In some auction environments, the initial seller has the option to elimi-
nate ineﬃciencies by taking actions that would prohibit resale. It is interest-
ing, therefore, to know how prohibiting resale would eﬀect initial-seller rev-
enue. This enables the initial seller to weigh the desire for eﬃciency against
the potential revenue loss from prohibiting resale. For English/second-price
auctions we show that resale opportunities have an ambiguous eﬀect on the
initial seller’s revenue: a little activity of the speculator (q ¼ 0) increases
the initial seller’s expected revenue, but a lot of activity (q ¼ 1) reduces
it. Hence, depending on the prevailing equilibrium an initial seller who is
restricted to an English or second-price auction without a (substantial) re-
serve price may or may not increase revenue by preventing resale. In the
case of ﬁrst-price/Dutch auctions, prohibiting resale never increases the ini-
tial seller’s revenue, and reduces it in some cases.
Our revenue results imply that ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions are
not revenue-equivalent: the second-price auction always has an equilibrium
that yields a lower revenue for the initial seller than the ﬁrst-price auction
equilibrium. Moreover, none of the ineﬃcient equilibria in the second-price
auction case yields the same allocation as the ﬁrst-price auction equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst that addresses how 0-
value bidders can “invade” markets with private-value buyers. Bikhchandani
3and Huang (1989) and Bose and Deltas (1999) analyze auctions where 0-
value bidders are allowed to participate, while ﬁnal consumers are conﬁned to
the resale market. These models make sense for US Treasury Bill auctions or
large real-estate auctions, where the 0-value bidders represent intermediaries
or middlemen who go on to sell to the general public. In Bikhchandani
and Huang, the 0-value bidders submit bids based on their private signals
about the common resale value. Bikhchandani and Huang provide suﬃcient
conditions such that a multiple-unit uniform-price auction yields a higher
revenue than a discriminatory auction. Bose and Deltas show that admitting
a single private-value buyer to an initial second-price auction will cause the
0-value bidders to reduce their bids or even abstain, thus lowering the initial
seller’s revenue.
Standard private-value auctions with resale and no speculators have been
examined by Haile (1999, 2000, 2003) and Gupta and Lebrun (1999). In
these models, active resale markets emerge as a consequence of changes of
the environment between periods. Haile (1999) allows for the arrival of new
buyers in the resale market. In Haile (2000, 2003) and Gupta and Lebrun
(1999), resale occurs because agents receive new information about their,
initially uncertain, private values, or because values are made public after
the initial auction. By construction, equilibria in these models lead to an
eﬃcient allocation. It is shown that the resale opportunity increases the
initial seller’s revenue if the resale seller has enough bargaining power in the
resale market.
Zheng (2000, Section 5.2) considers what happens if resale is possible
after an optimal auction ` a la Myerson (1981). He considers two possibly
asymmetric buyers and shows that there is an equilibrium in undominated
strategies where the buyers “collude”: one buyer bids high in the auction,
the other bids low; the high bidder wins at her reserve price and makes a
resale oﬀer to the low bidder. This equilibrium antedates the structure of
one of the equilibria that we identify in the second-price auction case (see
footnote 4). Like in our equilibria with q ¼ 1, in Zheng’s equilibrium the
initial seller’s revenue is smaller than in the situation where resale is not
possible.
Zheng (2002) considers mechanism-design of the initial seller in (possibly
asymmetric) private-value environments when she cannot prevent resale.
With two buyers, and in some cases with three of more, the seller-optimal
Myerson allocation can be implemented through repeated resale. In our case
of SIPV buyers and a speculator, the optimal mechanism is straightforward:
the initial seller simply excludes the speculator.
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999), Ausubel and Cramton (1999), and Calzo-
4lari and Pavan (2002), also study optimal auctions with resale. Jehiel and
Moldovanu consider environments with negative consumption externalities,
but no private information. They examine whether the Coasian notion that
the initial assignment of property rights has no eﬀect on eﬃciency holds
when resale is possible. Ausubel and Cramton assume that the resale mar-
ket will eventually lead to an eﬃcient allocation; it is then optimal for the
initial seller to implement an eﬃcient allocation right away. Calzolari and
Pavan compute optimal auctions in environments with two buyers with high
or low values. In contrast to most of the other literature, they assume that
the distribution of bargaining power in the resale market is a function of the
identity of the buyers. Calzolari and Pavan show that an important aspect
of the auction design is the initial seller’s bid announcement policy.
Because a bidder’s expected payoﬀ can be positive in the event that
some other bidder wins the auction, auctions in environments with allocative
externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, and Jehiel,
Moldovanu, and Stacchetti, 1996, 1999) share certain aspects of auctions
with resale. For example, in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) buyers pool at a
bid of 0. This feature also occurs in Haile (2000) and in our second-price
auction equilibria.
In Section 2, we set up the model. Section 3 characterizes the situations
where the standard no-resale equilibrium outcome remains valid when resale
becomes possible. Section 4 is devoted to the equilibria with an active resale
market in the English/second-price auction case. Section 5 deals with the
ﬁrst-price/Dutch auction case. The remarks in Section 6 pertain to the
breakdown of revenue equivalence, alternative bid announcement policies,
repeated resale, resale via standard auctions, and markets with a single
buyer. The Appendix contains proofs.
2 Model
We consider n ¸ 2 risk-neutral buyers who are interested in consuming a
single indivisible private good. Buyer i = 1;:::;n has the random value ˜ µi 2
[0;1] for the good. We also include a risk-neutral agent, called speculator,
who has value µs = 0 for the good. I.e., the speculator has no use value for
the good. Our crucial innovation is the inclusion of at least one speculator;
the results remain valid with free entry of speculators. Each of the n + 1
agents is called a bidder.
The buyers are ex ante identical and have independent private values
(Vickrey, 1961); i.e., the random variables ˜ µ1;:::; ˜ µn representing buyers’
5values are stochastically independent and all have the same probability dis-
tribution F.
Assumption 1 The distribution function F is continuous, F(0) = 0, F(1) =
1, and F has a positive and continuous density f on [0;1]. Moreover, F has
a weakly increasing hazard rate.
We consider a 2-period interaction. Before period 1, buyer i = 1;:::;n
privately learns the realization of her value, ˜ µi = µi. In period 1, the good
is oﬀered via a sealed-bid second-price auction (shorthand: II) or ﬁrst-price
auction (I) without reserve price. The highest bidding agent becomes the
new owner of the good. Our results do not depend on the tieing rule, but
to simplify some proofs we assume the speculator loses all ties.
All agents have a discount factor of ± 2 (0;1] between periods 1 and 2.2
In particular, in period 1 a buyer with value µi is willing to pay ±µi for the
right to consume the good in period 2. The agent who wins in period 1 either
consumes the good in period 1 or oﬀers the good for resale via an optimal
mechanism in period 2; if she fails to resell the good she consumes it in
period 2. This completes the interaction. Note that all market participants
are present in both periods.
Actions taken in period 2 may depend on information that is revealed
during period 1. Therefore, the bid announcement policy is important. Our
assumptions on bid information revealed in the second-price auction make
this auction format analogous to the standard English auction. Likewise,
the bid announcement policy we assume for the ﬁrst-price auction makes
this format analogous to the Dutch auction.
Assumption 2 After a second-price auction, the losers’ bids become public;
the winner’s bid remains private.
After a ﬁrst-price auction, the winner’s bid becomes public; the losers’
bids remain private.
In an English auction the losers’ dropping-out bids become public as the
auction progresses, and the winner’s dropping-out bid remains private be-
cause the auction stops at the second-highest bid. Assumption 2 ensures
that after the second-price auction the same information is revealed as dur-
ing an English auction. Our bias towards compatibility with the English
auction is motivated by the prevalence of English auctions, and the scarcity
2Most other studies of auctions with resale do not allow discounting between periods.
In our model, discounting only slightly complicates proofs, and increases the transparency
of the presentation.
6of second-price auctions.3 We will conduct the analysis using the second-
price auction framework. At the end of Section 4 we explain how the results
can be applied directly to the English auction setting.
The ﬁrst-price auction assumptions imply that the auction is strategi-
cally equivalent to a Dutch auction. Such an auction stops at the moment
the highest bid is revealed, such that the losers’ stopping bids remain pri-
vate. This assumption is needed for tractability, but it is also common for
real sellers to keep the losers’ bids private in sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auctions.
Since our focus is on the impact of the speculator, and the buyers are ex
ante identical, we will focus on equilibria such that all buyers use the same
bid function in period 1. In order to avoid complications in the deﬁnition of
posterior beliefs and resale mechanisms, we assume right away that this bid
function is strictly increasing in the winning range. Moreover, a buyer who
does not expect to ever win does not participate (i.e., bids 0).
Assumption 3 In equilibrium, all buyers use the same bid function b¤ in
period 1. For all µ;µ0 2 [0;1] with µ > µ0, we have b¤(µ) > b¤(µ0) if the
bid b¤(µ0) wins in equilibrium with positive probability, and have b¤(µ0) = 0
otherwise.
As for further regularity properties of b¤, note that we will construct equi-
libria in the second-price auction case where b¤ is not continuous. In the
ﬁrst-price auction case, there will be a unique equilibrium, where b¤ is always
continuous, but not necessarily diﬀerentiable.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium conditions are (i) that posterior beliefs
are determined by Bayes rule whenever possible, (ii) the resale mechanism
is optimal in the sense of maximizing the expected resale payoﬀ of the re-
sale seller (including her payoﬀ when she fails to resell and consumes her-
self) given her posterior beliefs, (iii) the period-1 winner decides optimally
whether to consume the good in period 1 or to oﬀer it for resale in period
2, and (iv) the period-1 bidding behavior is optimal. Let us spell out these
conditions.
Posterior beliefs after period 1
Consider a bidder who observes that buyer i’s value is in an interval I µ
[0;1]. Let a = inf I and b = supI. According to Bayes rule, the resulting
3See Rothkopf, Teisberg and Kahn (1990) for a discussion on why second-price auctions
are rare.






F(b)¡F(a) if µi 2 [a;b);
1 if µi ¸ b;
0 if µi < a:
Note that ˆ FI is a point distribution if b = a. If b > a, the distribution
ˆ FI has (on its support) the same regularity properties as F: a positive and
continuous density and an increasing hazard rate. By Assumption 3, the case
b > a becomes relevant only if an oﬀ-equilibrium bid or bid 0 is observed.
We deﬁne posterior beliefs about period-1 losers, for any possible bid
proﬁle b1;:::;bn;bs ¸ 0 (posterior beliefs about the period-1 winner will
not be relevant). Consider a buyer i who bids bi and loses the second-price
auction. Then, the other bidders’ posterior belief Π
II




i (¢ j bi) = ˆ Fb¤¡1(bi) if bi 2 b¤([0;1]); (1)
and is undetermined otherwise.
Now consider a buyer i who loses the ﬁrst-price auction. Let j denote
the label of the winner, and bj > 0 the winner’s bid. Then, the posterior
belief about i’s value of bidders other than i is given by
Π
I
i(¢ j j;bj) = ˆ Fb¤¡1([0;bj]) if [0;bj] \ b¤([0;1]) 6= ;; (2)
and is undetermined otherwise. Note that, by Assumption 3, the posterior
belief does not depend on the tieing rule. If bj = 0 the posterior belief can
depend on the tieing rule, but it is not necessary to spell out this case.
According to her posterior beliefs, the resale seller faces a group of bid-
ders with independent private values in period 2. Moreover, the posterior
beliefs are either point distributions or have an increasing hazard rate (for
simplicity, let us assume this for the undetermined oﬀ-path beliefs as well).
Optimal Resale Mechanism
The posterior beliefs determine which resale mechanism is optimal (in the
sense of maximizing expected period-2 payoﬀ) for the period-1 winner,
should she decide to oﬀer the good for resale. Because the posterior beliefs
induce independent private values among the bidders in the resale mecha-
nism, an optimal mechanism exists and can be computed using Myerson’s
(1981) methods. Myerson does not take account of point distributions, but
this is easily incorporated: the virtual valuation equals the value where
8the distribution is concentrated. Moreover, Maskin-Tirole (1990) show that
Myerson’s mechanism remains optimal when the seller has an independent
private value, as may be the case for our resale seller. Let M(Π;µi) denote
any Myerson mechanism that is optimal for a resale seller with value µi and
posterior beliefs Π.
For our analysis, the following posterior beliefs are of particular impor-
tance. The resale seller has value 0 and there are n bidders with indepen-
dent private values each distributed according to ˆ F[0;b], where b 2 (0;1]. In
such an environment, it is well-known that the optimal mechanism M(b)
def =
M( ˆ F[0;b];:::; ˆ F[0;b];0) induces the same expected payments and allocation
probabilities as a second-price auction with optimal reserve price, denoted
r¤(b). Note that, because the virtual valuation function for Fb is strictly
increasing, the reserve price is uniquely determined, and the reserve price
function r¤ is strictly increasing and continuous. Denote by Pb(µi) the ex-
pected payment of a bidder with value µi 2 [0;1] in the mechanism M(b),
and by Qb(µi) the probability that bidder i obtains the good. Important
properties of these functions are summarized in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
The seller’s expected revenue in the mechanism M(b) will be denoted M(b).
Of course, M is strictly increasing. Other important properties of M are
summarized in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. The following inequality, proved
in the Appendix, will play a crucial role.
Lemma 1 There exists a strictly positive function ´ on (0;1] such that
8² > 0; µ 2 [²;1] : Pµ(µ) ¸ M(µ) + ´(²): (3)
I.e., the payment of the highest type of bidder who participates in the resale
market is higher than the resale seller’s expected revenue.
A second important class of posterior beliefs are beliefs with the property
that the maximum value in the market is known. The optimal mechanism
then yields the same expected payments and allocation probabilities as a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a bidder with the highest value, unless the seller’s
value is higher, in which case the seller keeps the good.
Other posterior beliefs can also occur, but it is not necessary to compute
the resulting resale mechanisms. All that is needed for our results is that
the resale seller’s expected revenue cannot exceed the total expected surplus
available in the resale market.
In the second-price auction case, let M
II(i;b¡i;µi) denote the period-2
mechanism oﬀered by the period-1 winner i = 1;:::;n;s when the vector of
losers’ bids equals b¡i and i’s value is µi. In equilibrium, the resale seller’s




j (¢ j bj))j6=i;s;µi): (4)
Similarly, in the ﬁrst-price auction case let M
I(i;bi;µi) denote the period-2
mechanism oﬀered by the period-1 winner i = 1;:::;n;s when bi denotes
her bid and i’s value is µi. The optimality condition for the resale seller’s




j(¢ j i;bi))j6=i;s;µi): (5)
Optimal Period-1 Behavior in the Second-Price Auction
We need some notation for the outcome of the period-2 mechanism, be-
cause that determines the bidding incentives in period 1. For all bidders
i;j = 1;:::;n;s with j 6= i, all b¡i 2 [0;1)n, and all µi;µj 2 [0;1], let
P
II
j (i;b¡i;µi;µj) denote the expected transfer from bidder j of type µj to




denote the respective probability that bidder j obtains the good. Simi-
larly, let P
II(i;b¡i;µi) denote the expected transfer to the resale seller i, and
Q







j (i;b¡i;µi; ˜ µj) j b¤(˜ µj) = bj];
and
Q





j (i;b¡i;µi; ˜ µj) j b¤(˜ µj) = bj];
where the expectations are computed using the posterior beliefs Π
II
j (¢ j bj).
We are now in a position to spell out the bidders’ payoﬀ functions. Let
b¤
s denote the speculator’s equilibrium bid. Deﬁne ˜ bi = b¤(˜ µi) for all i 6= s,
and ˜ bs = b¤
s. For all i, let ˜ b¡i = (˜ bj)j6=i and let ˜ b
(1)
¡i = maxj6=i˜ bi. For all i;j,
let ˜ b¡i¡j = (˜ bk)k62fi;jg. Buyer i’s expected payoﬀ when she bids bi and has





















i (j;(bi;˜ b¡j¡i); ˜ µj;µi) ¡ P
II
i (j;(bi;˜ b¡j¡i); ˜ µj;µi)
´
1w(bi;˜ b¡i)=j ];
10where w denotes the period-1 winner as a function of the bid proﬁle. The
max-term reﬂects the condition that after winning in period 1, i decides
optimally whether to consume the good or oﬀer it for resale.









The optimal bidding conditions are







Optimal Period-1 Behavior in the First-Price Auction
Analogously to the second-price auction case, for all i;j = 1;:::;n;s with
j 6= i, all bi 2 [0;1), and all µi;µj 2 [0;1], let P
I
j(i;bi;µi;µj) denote the




j(i;bi;µi;µj) denote the respective probability that
bidder j obtains the good. Similarly, let P
I(i;bi;µi) denote the expected
transfer to the resale seller i, and Q
I(i;bi;µi) the probability that the resale
seller keeps the good.
We allow the speculator to randomize her bid because otherwise no equi-
librium may exist. Let ˜ bs denote an independent random variable for the
speculator’s bid.
Buyer i’s expected payoﬀ when she bids bi and has the value µi equals
ui(bi;µi) = E[










i(j;˜ bj; ˜ µj;µi) ¡ P
I
i(j;˜ bj; ˜ µj;µi)
´
1w(bi;˜ b¡i)=j ]:
For the speculator, the expected payoﬀ function is given by
us(bs) = E[(¡bs + ±P
I(s;bs;µs))1w(bs;˜ b¡s)=s ]:
The optimal bidding conditions are
8i 6= s;µi : b¤(µi) 2 argmax
bi¸0
ui(bi;µi); (8)
Pr[˜ bs 2 argmax
bs¸0
us(bs)] = 1: (9)
11Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
A vector (b¤;b¤
s) is a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium outcome for the second-
price auction with resale if there exists Π
II
¢ and M
II such that (1), (4), (6),
and (7) are satisﬁed.
A vector (b¤;H) is a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium outcome for the ﬁrst-
price auction with resale if there exists Π
I
¢ and M
I such that (2), (5), (8),
and (9) are satisﬁed, where H denotes the distribution function for ˜ bs.
Speculation-Proof Auctions
An important question to ask is whether the anticipation of a resale op-
portunity will change bidding in an auction. Let b
I denote the standard
equilibrium bid function for the ﬁrst-price auction without resale, and let
b
II denote the weakly dominant strategy for every buyer in the second-price
auction without resale. Let us call an auction a 2 fI; IIg weakly speculation-
proof (in the environment (n;F;±)) if auction a with resale has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium where the buyers use the bid function ba and the spec-
ulator bids 0. Let us call an auction strongly speculation-proof if this is the
case for all perfect Bayesian equilibria. Note that if in auction a 2 fI; IIg the
buyers use ba and the speculator bids 0, all bidders believe that the auction
assigns the good to the buyer with the highest value. Hence, there will be
no activity in the resale market.
A standard auction is weakly speculation-proof if and only if two things
hold. First, no buyer has an incentive to increase her bid and subsequently
oﬀer the good for resale. Second, the speculator cannot make a proﬁt by
submitting a positive bid and then oﬀer the good for resale. Haile (1999,
Theorem 1) has shown that the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed for all standard
auctions. What is new to our analysis is the second condition.
3 Are Standard Auctions Speculation-Proof?
Consider the second-price auction. Suppose buyers use the bid function
b
II. If the speculator makes a positive bid and wins, her optimal resale
mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at a price equal to her own payment
in the auction; hence, it is optimal to bid 0. In other words:
Proposition 1 The second-price auction is weakly speculation-proof in all
environments (n;F;±).
12Proposition 3 shows that second-price auctions are not strongly speculation-
proof.
The situation is diﬀerent in the case of ﬁrst-price auctions. In Proposi-
tion 5 we will show that there always is a unique equilibrium. Therefore,
the ﬁrst-price auction is strongly speculation-proof if and only if it is weakly
speculation-proof. Proposition 2 below shows two things. On the one hand,
for any number of buyers n, it can happen that the auction is not speculation-
proof. On the other hand, if the number of buyers is large, the auction is
speculation-proof even for discount factors very close to 1.
Proposition 2 For every buyer number n ¸ 2, there exists a number ±n <
1 with the following property.
If and only if ± > ±n, there exists a distribution F such that the
ﬁrst-price auction is not (weakly or strongly) speculation-proof
in the environment (n;F;±).
Moreover, ±n ! 1 as n ! 1.
The result that the ﬁrst-price auction can fail to be weakly speculation-
proof is particularly striking. It strongly suggests that any analysis of ﬁrst-
price auctions with resale that ignores speculators is incomplete.
For an example of a ﬁrst-price auction that is not weakly speculation-
proof, consider a distribution F such that, except at points close to 1, the
density is that of an exponential distribution; i.e., F(µ) = 1¡e¡zµ, for some
z 2 (0;1). When the point 1 is approached, the density suddenly peaks.
Such a distribution satisﬁes Assumption 1: it has a constant hazard rate up
to values close to 1, but then the hazard rate increases sharply. Suppose
that all buyers use the standard no-resale bid function b
I. The speculator
can make a proﬁt by bidding b
I(1) in the auction, followed by a take-it-or-
leave-it-oﬀer just below 1 in period 2. By deﬁnition of b
I, the bid b
I(1) equals
the expectation of the distribution Fn¡1, which approximates





¿e¡¿(1 ¡ e¡¿)n¡2d¿ + 1 ¡ (1 ¡ e¡z)n¡1: (10)
The resale revenue approximates the probability that at least one buyer has
a value close to 1,
r(z;n) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ e¡z)n: (11)
Using the Taylor expansion for e¡z, one ﬁnds that for z ¼ 0,
r(z;n) = 1 ¡ zn + higher order terms
13and
e(z;n) = 1 ¡
1
n
zn¡1 + higher order terms:
Therefore, r(z;n) > e(z;n) for small z. Hence, when the discount factor is
close to 1, the auction is not speculation-proof.
The remaining steps of the proof of Proposition 2 are in the Appendix.
The main idea of the proof is to show that the type of distribution used in
the example above gives the speculator the best chances to make a proﬁt;






Note that in cases where the ﬁrst-price auction is not speculation-proof,
it is not obvious what constitutes an equilibrium or indeed whether an equi-
librium exists at all. Proposition 5 solves this problem.
4 Equilibria for the Second-Price Auction with
Resale
The main results in this section are Proposition 3 which identiﬁes the equi-
librium outcomes, and Proposition 4 which discusses the impact of resale
on initial seller revenue. We also explain why our equilibria remain valid if
multiple speculators can participate, and discuss the consequences of hav-
ing a reserve price in the initial auction. The section concludes with an
explanation of how to adapt the equilibria to the case of English auctions.
The equilibrium outcomes are described in Proposition 3 below. Buyers
with values below a certain cutoﬀ µ¤ pool at a bid of 0 in period 1, while
buyers with values above the cutoﬀ bid their values. The speculator’s bid
wins if and only if all buyers have values below the cutoﬀ. The exact size
of the speculator’s bid is determined by the optimality condition for the
buyer’s bid function.4 5
4 The equilibrium with µ
¤ = 1 and b
¤
s = 1 is similar to the one constructed by Zheng
(2000, Section 5.2) in a slightly diﬀerent context with two bidders.
5None of the equilibria we construct in the second-price auction case can be discarded
using standard equilibrium reﬁnements: the equilibria are in undominated strategies and
the intuitive criterion is satisﬁed; see Garratt and Tr¨ oger, 2003.
14Proposition 3 If (b¤;b¤
s) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the
second-price auction with resale then there exists a µ¤ 2 [0;1] such that
b¤(µi) =
½
0 if µi 2 [0;µ¤);
µi if µi 2 (µ¤;1);
(13)
if µ¤ < 1 then b¤
s = µ¤ ¡ ± (µ¤ ¡ Pµ¤(µ¤));
if µ¤ = 1 then b¤
s ¸ 1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ P1(1)):
(14)
Conversely, for every µ¤ 2 [0;1] there exists an equilibrium outcome (b¤;b¤
s)
such that (13) and (14) hold. Moreover,
8µ¤ 2 [0;1] : b¤
s ¸ Pµ¤(µ¤): (15)
Any speculator payoﬀ in the interval [0;±M(1)] is supported by an equilib-
rium.
A striking aspect of this result is the existence of equilibria that are
proﬁtable for the speculator. The speculator makes proﬁts by buying low
and selling high, even though all bidders are present at all times. Speculation
works because the speculator does not have to pay her own bid. She submits
an aggressive bid that makes low-value buyers willing to wait for a resale
oﬀer, and pays the second-highest bid, 0. This way the speculator buys at
price 0 and sells, in expectation, at a positive price.
The speculator’s proﬁt depends on the prevailing equilibrium. In a µ¤-
equilibrium the speculator wins in period 1 with probability Fn(µ¤). Thus,
her payoﬀ equals ±Fn(µ¤)M(µ¤). The speculator’s largest proﬁt, ±M(1),
occurs when she completely captures the market (µ¤ = 1). She makes, of
course, no proﬁt in the bid-your-value equilibrium outcome (µ¤ = 0; cf.
Proposition 1). The participation requirement in Assumption 3 precludes
the existence of additional equilibria where buyers with values below µ¤
would make a positive bid and the speculator’s proﬁt would be reduced
accordingly.
On ﬁrst glance, the speculator seems the least likely candidate to become
a successful trader because she is the weakest bidder in terms of her con-
sumption value. However, the fact that her zero value is common knowledge
among buyers actually simpliﬁes the construction of equilibria: everybody
knows that if the speculator becomes the resale seller, she will oﬀer the
good cheaper than anybody else would, and there is no uncertainty about
the resale mechanism.6
6We do, however, not claim that the possibility of an active resale market always
15Because buyers’ bids in the range (0;µ¤] occur with probability 0, the
equilibria rely on appropriately deﬁned oﬀ-path posterior beliefs. In partic-
ular, buyers with values below µ¤ must prefer to bid 0 rather than make a
bid in the losing range (0;b¤
s). One way to guarantees this is to deﬁne beliefs
about a buyer i who bids bi and loses as follows,
Π
II
i (µi j bi)
def = 1µi¸µ¤ if bi 2 (0;µ¤]: (16)
Given such beliefs, a deviation to a bid in (0;b¤
s) would raise the resale
price to µ¤ because the speculator believes that µ¤ is the highest value in the
market. Generally, the equilibria can be supported by any oﬀ-path posterior
beliefs that do not reduce the resale price. For example, the posterior beliefs
could be identical to the beliefs about a buyer who bids 0, leaving the resale
price unchanged.7
Let us sketch the main steps of the proof of Proposition 3. We begin
with the necessary equilibrium conditions (13) and (14). On any equilibrium
path, a buyer who wins consumes the good rather than oﬀering it for resale.
This is because by Assumption 3, a buyer who wins has the highest value in
the market. But when a buyer consumes the good upon winning, she ﬁnds it
optimal to bid her value, by the same argument as in a second-price auction
without resale. On the other hand, buyer types who are overbid by the
speculator never win the auction, and consequently bid 0 by Assumption
3. We obtain (13) when we deﬁne µ¤ as the largest type who does not
overbid the speculator. The speculator’s bid (14) is chosen such that buyers
with value above µ¤ prefer to bid their value rather than 0, and vice versa
for buyers with value below µ¤. If µ¤ < 1, a buyer with value µ¤ is just
indiﬀerent between these possibilities; if µ¤ = 1, all buyer types may strictly
prefer to bid 0.
A buyer with value µ¤ can be willing to wait for resale only if the expected
resale payment is not higher than the price at which she could buy the good
today. Accordingly, (15) follows from (14).
To complete the proof of Proposition 3, we have to show that an equi-
librium satisfying (13) and (14) exists. Consider the case µ¤ < 1; the case
µ¤ = 1 is similar. Optimality of the speculator’s bid is straightforward. The
bid b¤
s lies in the range (0;µ¤]. All bids in this range are equally good for the
requires activity of a speculator; asymmetric bidding among symmetric buyers can create
a continuum of equilibria with active resale markets as well, at least in markets with
2 buyers and no discounting. Garratt and Tr¨ oger (2003, p.26) show this in the case
where buyers’ values are distributed uniformly, but equilibria can also be constructed for
arbitrary value distributions (personal communication by Charles Zheng, Summer 2003).
7We thank Bill Zame for suggesting these beliefs.
16speculator because they lead to the same chances of winning the auction.
Bidding more than µ¤ is not as good because in the event that the specula-
tor needs such a high bid in order to win, she wins at a price equal to the
highest value among all buyers. Optimality of the buyers’ bid function is
more involved. A low-value buyer can deviate by overbidding the speculator
and attempting resale herself; if she fails to resell the good, she still obtains
her value from consuming it. An explicit computation shows that such a
deviation is not proﬁtable. We also show that a buyer with value above µ¤
has no incentive to bid 0 and wait for a resale oﬀer. By (14), type µ¤ is
indiﬀerent between doing that and bidding her value. Higher types have an
additional incentive to bid their value because the highest opponent value
might be in between µ¤ and their own value.
All equilibria remain valid with free entry of multiple speculators. If
there is nothing to prevent the presence of a speculator in a market with
resale, then multiple speculators might be present as well. Consider a second
speculator. She can make a proﬁt only if she overbids the ﬁrst speculator’s
bid b¤
s. Bidding higher than µ¤ can only harm her: if she needs such a high
bid in order to win, the highest value in the market does not exceed her
payment in the auction. So her best hope is a bid in the interval (b¤
s;µ¤).
Any such bid yields the resale revenue ±M(µ¤), which by Lemma 1 is lower
than the expected period-2 payment of type µ¤. By (15), however, that
payment is at most as high as b¤
s, showing that the second speculator would
make a loss.
When the initial auction is augmented by a reserve price r > 0, the
equilibrium outcomes where the speculator’s resale revenue ±M(µ¤) ¸ r
remain valid. This is because Lemma 1 together with (15) implies b¤
s ¸ r
for such equilibrium outcomes. The bid-your-value equilibrium outcome
(µ¤ = 0) also remains valid. All other equilibria break down. Proposition 3
is robust to small reserve prices in the sense that that for all µ¤ 2 [0;1], the
µ¤-equilibrium remains valid if r is suﬃciently small.
Note that all equilibria established in Proposition 3, except the one with
µ¤ = 0, are ineﬃcient. Because the speculator wins the auction with positive
probability, the ﬁnal allocation is delayed with positive probability. Even ig-
noring ineﬃciencies due to delay, the resale market will induce an ineﬃcient
allocation in the sense that the speculator keeps the good with positive prob-
ability (due to a positive reserve price). Therefore, in the context of resale
the second-price auction loses what has been propagated as one of its main
advantages in environments with private values: to implement an eﬃcient
allocation as the unique equilibrium outcome in undominated strategies.
Let us compare the agents’ payoﬀs in the ineﬃcient equilibria with their
17payoﬀs in the eﬃcient equilibrium where all bidders bid their values. The
speculator is obviously better oﬀ in the ineﬃcient equilibria compared to the
eﬃcient one, and it can be shown that the buyers are worse oﬀ regardless of
their values. What about the initial seller? It is interesting to compare her
expected revenue in the ineﬃcient equilibria to her expected revenue in the
eﬃcient equilibrium. Proposition 4 below shows that a little activity of the
speculator increases the initial seller’s expected revenue, but a lot of activity
reduces it.
Proposition 4 For all µ¤ > 0 that are suﬃciently close to 0 (resp., 1), the
initial seller’s expected revenue in a µ¤-equilibrium is larger (resp, smaller)
than the expected revenue that results when all bidders bid their values.
The proof begins by distinguishing two distinct events that cause the
revenue in a µ¤-equilibrium to diﬀer from the revenue that arises in the bid-
your-value equilibrium. Event (i) is that µ¤ lies between the highest and
the second-highest value, in which case revenue changes from the second-
highest value to b¤
s. Event (ii) is that µ¤ is larger that the highest value, in
which case revenue falls from the second-highest value to 0. If µ¤ is close to
1 the probability of (i) becomes small and the probability of (ii) does not,
implying that expected revenue is reduced. If µ¤ tends to 0 both events’
probabilities tend to 0, but event (i) allows one buyer’s value to stay above
µ¤ and thus becomes inﬁnitely more likely than event (ii). The expected
payoﬀ loss from event (ii) is of the order µ¤. It is thus suﬃcient to show that
event (i) results in an expected payoﬀ gain of the order µ¤. Using (15), one
obtains a lower bound for the expected payoﬀ diﬀerence. Using properties
of order statistics, one can verify that the payoﬀ diﬀerence is positive of the
order µ¤ if the value distribution F is uniform. However, any continuously
diﬀerentiable distribution is approximately uniform on any small interval,
which completes the proof.
Proposition 4 remains qualitatively valid when the initial auction is aug-
mented by a small reserve price. The result establishes strict revenue in-
equalities. The inequalities remain intact because the revenue from a µ¤-
equilibrium is continuous in the reserve price.
By setting a large reserve price, the initial seller can shut out the specu-
lator. However, this might require a reserve price larger than the price that
would be revenue maximizing in the absence of resale. Using this, it can
be shown that the existence of a resale opportunity can harm a revenue-
maximizing seller who can set any reserve price (see Garatt and Tr¨ oger,
2003).
18An eﬃciency-minded (i.e., expected surplus maximizing) seller might
want to allow activity of a speculator rather than set a large reserve price.
If following a small or no reserve price a µ¤-equilibrium with small µ¤ > 0 is
played, and following intermediate reserve prices a µ¤-equilibrium with large
µ¤ is played, it can be less ineﬃcient to not set a reserve price rather than
set a large one that would shut out the speculator but keeps the good in the
hands of the initial seller with high probability.
English Auction with optimal resale
The equilibrium outcomes that we have constructed remain valid if the
second-price auction in period 1 is replaced by an English auction, as mod-
elled by Milgrom and Weber (1982). At the end of period 1, exactly the
same information is revealed after an English auction as after a second-price
auction, provided the same bids are made in both auctions. Hence, the only
thing we need to argue is that bidding incentives in period 1 do not change.
The diﬀerence between the second-price auction and the English auction is
that the losing bids become public during instead of after the auction, so
that bidders can revise their beliefs each time a buyer drops out.
We deﬁne bidding in the English auction as follows. Every low-value
buyer (µi < µ¤) stops bidding at 0, and every high-value buyer (µi > µ¤) is
willing to bid up to her value, independently of who stays in and how long.
The speculator is willing to bid up to b¤
s, also independently of who stays in
and how long.
To see that these bidding strategies are optimal, consider ﬁrst the spec-
ulator’s bidding incentives, given the buyers’ strategies. At the bid 0, it is
better to stay in than to drop out because the latter means she foregoes her
chances of winning and making a resale proﬁt. If some buyer stays in at 0
as well, Bayesian updating requires the speculator to believe that the value
of this buyer is distributed on the support [µ¤;1]. She expects the buyer to
stay in up to her value, which is beyond b¤
s. Hence, it is optimal for the
speculator to drop out at b¤
s. If one buyer deviates by stopping at a bid
in (0;µ¤], the speculator switches to the belief that the value of this buyer
equals µ¤ and will thus oﬀer the same take-it-or-leave-it resale mechanism
as in the second-price auction case.
Now consider a buyer’s bidding incentives, given the other bidders’ strate-
gies. A low-value buyer has no incentive to stay in beyond bid 0, for the
same reasons as in the second-price auction case. A high-value buyer will
stay in up to her value because she expects the same from all other buyers
once they stay in at positive bids. When a high-value buyer observes that a
19competing buyer drops out at a bid in (0;µ¤], she switches to the belief that
this buyer has value µ¤, and it remains optimal for the high-value buyer to
bid up to her value.
5 The Equilibrium in the First-Price Auction with
Resale
The main result in this section is Proposition 5 which establishes existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium. Corollary 1 concerns the impact of a re-
sale opportunity on the initial seller’s revenue. We also discuss the impact
of augmenting the initial auction by a reserve price, and explain why the
equilibrium remains valid if multiple speculators can participate.
Proposition 5 The ﬁrst-price auction with resale has a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium outcome (b¤;H). We have
8µ 2 [0;1] : b¤(µ) ¸ maxfb
I(µ);±M(µ)g; (17)
where b
I denotes the standard no-resale ﬁrst-price auction equilibrium bid
function.
The following three statements are equivalent:
9µ 2 [0;1] : ±M(µ) > b
I(µ); (18)
H(0) < 1; (19)
9µ 2 [0;1] : b¤(µ) > b
I(µ): (20)
This result has three immediate implications. First, from (17) one sees
that the speculator’s equilibrium payoﬀ always equals 0—speculation is not
proﬁtable. This contrasts the second-price auction where a speculator can
make proﬁts. Second, the auction fails to be speculation-proof if and only
if (20) holds. Therefore,
Corollary 1 Whenever the ﬁrst-price auction is not (weakly or strongly)
speculation-proof, the initial seller’s equilibrium revenue is higher than in
the ﬁrst-price auction without resale.
Third, whenever the auction is not speculation-proof, the ﬁnal allocation
will not be fully eﬃcient. The speculator keeps the good with positive
probability. Without a resale opportunity, the speculator would bid 0 and
the allocation would be eﬃcient. I.e., in the context of resale the ﬁrst-price
20auction can lose its ability to implement an eﬃcient allocation when buyers
have SIPV.
The proof of Proposition 5 is split up into a series of lemmas. First,
a unique equilibrium candidate is established. Then we prove existence.
Lemma 4 shows that the buyer will not bid above her value. By Assump-
tion 3, such a bid would win with positive probability. In that event, the
buyer would obtain a negative payoﬀ. In the event the bid does not win,
lowering her bid does not change the buyer’s payoﬀ because losing bids are
not observable to the winner.
Lemma 5 shows that, with positive probability, the speculator makes
arbitrarily small bids. Suppose not. Then, by Lemma 4, buyers with val-
ues below the support of the speculator’s bid distribution never win the
auction. By Lemma 1, the highest among these buyer types pays a price in
period 2 that is higher than the speculator’s revenue when making her lowest
equilibrium bid. This revenue, in turn, is at least as high as the specula-
tor’s payment in the auction (otherwise the speculator would make expected
losses). Therefore, the buyer can get the good cheaper with positive proba-
bility when she slightly overbids the speculator’s lowest equilibrium bid.
Lemma 6 shows that the speculator’s equilibrium payoﬀ equals 0. Be-
cause she makes arbitrarily small bids by Lemma 5, she could obtain a
positive payoﬀ only if a positive mass of buyer types bid exactly 0. An ar-
gument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 5 shows that some of these
buyer types would prefer to deviate to a small positive bid.
Lemma 7 shows that the speculator’s bid distribution has no atoms.
If there were an atom, some buyer types would bid just below it because
otherwise the speculator would prefer to bid lower. However, using Lemma
1 again, buyer types who bid just below the atom have to pay so much in
period 2 that they prefer to overbid the atom.
Lemma 8 states that the buyers’ equilibrium bid function is continuous.
The proof is standard. Lemma 9 states that every buyer with a positive
value will bid below her value; this is because even arbitrarily small bids
have a positive chance of winning by Lemma 5.
Lemma 10 uses the buyers’ incentive compatibility constraints in period
1 to show that the buyers’ bid function b¤ satisﬁes a certain diﬀerential
equation. The derivative of b¤ depends on two factors. Firstly, it depends
on the bidding competition among the buyers themselves. This competition
yields a lower bound for the derivative of b¤. This lower bound is identical
to the right-hand side of the diﬀerential equation for the standard no-resale
equilibrium bid function b
I. Secondly, the derivative of b¤ depends on the
21added competition from the speculator’s bidding. At every point where
competition among the buyers has dropped to a point that would allow
the speculator to make a positive proﬁt without added competition, the
derivative of b¤ increases so that the speculator makes zero proﬁt. Lemma
10 then goes on and determines a diﬀerential equation for H, the distribution
function for the speculator’s bid, such that b¤ becomes in fact optimal for the
buyers. At every point where the competition among buyers is not strong
enough to keep the speculator’s proﬁt equal to 0, the speculator must add
in just so much probability weight that her proﬁt becomes equal to 0.
We then turn to the equilibrium existence proof. The diﬀerential equa-
tion for b¤ constructed in Lemma 10 is not continuous: at each point where
the speculator’s starts adding in probability weight, the right-derivative of
b¤ may jump upwards. In Lemmas 11 and 12, we apply techniques from the
theory of diﬀerential inclusions8 to show that the diﬀerential equation for b¤
has a solution.
To complete the existence proof, we show that each buyer type’s equi-
librium bid is globally optimal. The diﬀerential equations constructed in
Lemma 10 only guarantee that ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed. Also, we
show that no buyer has an incentive to bid higher in an attempt to oﬀer
the good for resale herself. Optimality of the speculator’s bid follows by
construction. The equivalence of the three statements (18) to (20) is easily
seen.
The equilibrium established in Proposition 5 remains valid with free en-
try of multiple speculators because a second speculator obtains the same
zero payoﬀ as the ﬁrst from any bid. There also exist equilibria with mul-
tiple active speculators. Buyers will use the same bid function as in the
equilibrium constructed above, and the distribution function for the maxi-
mum bid among speculators will be equal to the function H constructed for
the equilibrium with one speculator.
If the initial auction is augmented by a small reserve price r > 0, the
equilibrium must still involve an active speculator in some cases. The no-
resale equilibrium bid of any type µ 2 (r;1] is continuous in r. Therefore,
Proposition 2 shows that when r is small there exist cases where in equilib-
rium the speculator must be active. Any suﬃciently large reserve price will
shut out the speculator, which extends the result that speculators cannot
make proﬁts in ﬁrst-price auctions with resale. An eﬃciency-minded seller
has, in cases where the ﬁrst-price auction is not speculation-proof, a choice
8We thank J¨ org Oechssler for help with this part of the proof.
22between two ineﬃciencies: either she uses a reserve price that leaves the
good in her hands with some probability, or she uses no reserve price, which
makes the speculator keep the good with some probability.
6 Remarks
Breakdown of Revenue Equivalence
A resale opportunity, by attracting a speculator, destroys the revenue equiv-
alence of standard auctions. By Proposition 4, Corollary 1, and revenue-
equivalence in the absence of resale, the second-price auction with resale
always has an equilibrium that yields a lower revenue for the initial seller
than the unique equilibrium in the ﬁrst-price auction with resale. More-
over, whenever the ﬁrst-price auction is speculation-proof, the second-price
auction with resale has an equilibrium that yields a higher revenue for the
initial seller than the ﬁrst-price auction.
In cases where the ﬁrst-price auction is not speculation-proof, none of the
equilibria of the second-price auction with resale induces the same allocation
as the equilibrium in the ﬁrst-price auction with resale. This follows from
Lemma 5. Because the speculator makes arbitrarily small bids with positive
probability, buyers with arbitrarily small positive types have a chance to
obtain the good. In every µ¤-equilibrium with µ¤ > 0, however, types below
the speculator’s resale reserve price have no chance to get the good.
Bid Announcement Policy
The structure of our second-price auction equilibria suggests that they re-
main valid under any bid announcement policy of the initial seller. Even if
the initial seller keeps all bids secret, the winner learns the second-highest
bid from her payment, and this information is suﬃcient to make the infer-
ences that support the speculator’s resale mechanism.9
In the ﬁrst-price auction case, the equilibrium outcome can change if
losers’ bids are made public. One can verify that when losers’ bids remain
9Establishing general equilibrium conditions for the second-price auction with secret
bids would, however, be tedious. Among other complications, two bidders can have diﬀer-
ent posterior beliefs about a third. To see this, suppose bidder j wins at price p
1. If bidder
i 6= j has made a bid bi < p
1 then she learns that there exists at least one other bidder
who has made the bid p
1. If bi = p
1 then she only learns that no other bidder has made
a bid above p
1; she cannot learn anything about whether somebody has bid precisely p
1.
Because bi is not publicly observable, two agents may thus have diﬀerent beliefs about a
third agent.
23private, the auction is speculation-proof in an environment with two buyers
with uniformly distributed values and small discounting. In the same envi-
ronment with losers’ bids made public, the auction is not speculation-proof.
If it were, the speculator could win the auction for sure at a price of 1=2, and
from the observed losers’ bids she would infer the maximum value among
buyers, which has the expectation 2=3 > 1=2.
Repeated Resale
Our equilibria remain valid in a model with more than 2 periods; i.e., where
repeated resale is permitted. Our equilibrium constructions rely on only two
classes of posterior beliefs. Those where posterior beliefs induce an SIPV
environment in the resale market, and those where posterior beliefs are such
that the highest value in the market is known. In both cases, the equilibrium
in the optimal resale mechanism remains valid when the resale seller cannot
prevent further resale.
Resale via Standard Auctions
Our equilibria remain valid if the resale seller is restricted to a standard
auction with reserve price. Given the posterior beliefs that are relevant for
our equilibrium constructions, a standard auction with optimal reserve is an
optimal auction.
One Buyer and One Speculator
If only a single buyer is present in the market (n = 1), the ﬁrst-price auction
is never speculation-proof because in the absence of resale the buyer would
bid 0. The lack of bidding competition among buyers also makes it easier
than in the case of multiple buyers to construct an equilibrium (see Tr¨ oger,
2003). In second-price auctions, the structure of the equilibria with a single
buyer is the same as with multiple buyers, but the equilibrium existence
proof is simpler because it is obvious that the buyer will not oﬀer the good
for resale (see Garratt and Tr¨ oger, 2003). In both the ﬁrst-price auction and
the second-price auction, the initial seller’s revenue equals 0 if resale is not
possible. Hence, the resale opportunity can only increase the revenue.
247 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 2 Consider any µ 2 [0;1]. For all ˆ µ 2 [0;r¤(µ)), we have Pµ(ˆ µ) = 0
and Qµ(ˆ µ) = 0. For all ˆ µ 2 [r¤(µ);µ],
Pµ(ˆ µ)
Qµ(ˆ µ)








is weakly increasing in ˆ µ and µ; (22)
Qµ(ˆ µ) = Fn¡1(ˆ µ)=Fn¡1(µ): (23)
For all ˆ µ 2 [µ;1],
Qµ(ˆ µ) = 1; Pµ(ˆ µ) = Pµ(µ): (24)
Proof of Lemma 2. Formulas (21) and (23) are standard. Buyers with
types ˆ µ > µ occur with probability 0 according to the posterior beliefs; for
such buyers it is optimal in the resale mechanism to take the actions that are
optimal for type µ. This implies (24). To see (22), use that r¤ is increasing
and the derivative of Pµ(ˆ µ)=Qµ(ˆ µ) with respect to ˆ µ is non-negative. QED





























The function M is Lipschitz continuous on [0;1], and M0 is continuous.
Proof. Formula (25) is standard from Myerson (1981), while (26) follows
from standard diﬀerentiation rules. By diﬀerentiability, F(ˆ µ) = f(0)ˆ µ+e(ˆ µ)
for some function e such that e(ˆ µ)=ˆ µ ! 0 as ˆ µ ! 0. Using this and r¤(µ)=µ !












25which implies (27). Using (26) and (28), it can be conﬁrmed that limµ!0 M0(µ) =
M0(0). Therefore, M0 is continuous on [0;1]. Hence, M0 is bounded above
on [0;1], which implies Lipschitz continuity of M. QED







































· Pµ(µ) ¡ ´(²);
where ´(²)
def = P²(²)Fn(r¤(²)) > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.
Deﬁne ±n by (12). As shown on page 13, r(z;n) > e(z;n) for all suﬃ-
ciently small z > 0, implying ±n < 1.
Because r(z;n) · 1 and minz2[0;1] e(z;n) ! 1 as n ! 1, we have ±n ! 1
as n ! 1, which proves the “Moreover” part.
To prove the “if and only if” part, denote, for all n ¸ 2 and ± < 1,
by ¼(n;±) the maximum proﬁt that is possible for the speculator for any
distribution F that satisﬁes Assumption 1 and any bid bs ¸ 0, given that
all buyers play b
I. We have to show that
8n 9±n < 1 : ¼(n;±) > 0 , ± > ±n: (30)
For any distribution function D, let D(k;l) denote the distribution function
for the lth-highest order statistic among k i.i.d. random variables (k =
1;2:::; l = 1;:::;k) that are distributed according to D.
Fix any F, n, and ± < 1. Suppose that all buyers play b
I. If the
speculator bids bs = b
I(1) and all buyers play b
I, the speculator’s payoﬀ
equals
¼(F;n;±)




26by deﬁnition of b
I. If the speculator bids bs < b
I(1) and we deﬁne ˆ µ =
b













¼( ˆ F[0;ˆ µ];n;±):




Next we show that
sup
F
¼(F;n;±) · maxf0; max
z2[0;1]
±r(z;n) ¡ e(z;n)g: (32)
Because a second-price auction is an optimal resale mechanism,
¼(F;n;±) = ±
µ









where r¤ denotes the optimal reserve price. From Myerson (1981) we know
that r¤ = 1=¸(r¤), where ¸(µ) = f(µ)=(1 ¡ F(µ)), µ 2 [0;1), denotes the
hazard-rate function for F. We can write












(¸(t) ¡ ¹)dt = 0
and ¸(t) ¡ ¹ is weakly increasing in t. Therefore,








8µ 2 [0;r¤] : F(µ) · G(µ)
def = 1 ¡ e¡µ¹:
27Also deﬁne G(µ) = F(µ) for µ 2 (r¤;1]. Then G(r¤) = F(r¤) and F stochas-
tically dominates G. Therefore,
¼(F;n;±) · ˆ G
def = ±
µ









For arbitrary i.i.d. random variables with densities, the highest of n ¡ 1
dominates the 2nd highest of n in terms of the likelihood ratio. Therefore,
the expectation of the highest of n¡1 conditional on being greater or equal
















ˆ G · ±
³





µdG(n¡1;1)(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ G(n¡1;1)(r¤))G¤:
Because G(n¡1;1)(r¤) · G(n;2)(r¤) and G¤ ¸ r¤, it follows that
ˆ G · ±
³





µdG(n¡1;1)(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ G(n¡1;1)(r¤))r¤
= ±
¡







¿e¡¿(1 ¡ e¡¿)n¡2d¿ ¡ (1 ¡ (1 ¡ e¡z)n¡1)r¤;
where z
def = ¹r¤ = ¹=¸(r¤) · 1 and we have made the substitution ¿ = µ¹ in
the integral. Because r¤ · 1, it follows that
ˆ G · maxf0;±r(z;n) ¡ e(z;n)g;
which together with (33) shows (32).





±r(z;n) ¡ e(z;n): (34)
For all r¤ 2 (0;1) and ¹ 2 (0;1=r¤), deﬁne Gr¤;¹ as the distribution function
on [0;1] with density
gr¤;¹(µ) =
½
¹e¡¹µ if µ 2 [0;r];
¹e¡¹r + ®r;¹(µ ¡ r) if µ 2 [r;1];
where ®r;¹ is chosen such that
R 1
0 gr¤;¹(µ)dµ = 1 and r < 1 is so close to 1
that r > r¤ and ®r;¹ > 0. Given this construction, Gr¤;¹ has an increasing






This completes the proof of (34).
To prove (30), note that if and only if ± > ±n, there exists z 2 [0;1] such
that ± > e(z;n)=r(z;n). Therefore, using (31), (32), and (34), one sees that
¼(n;±) > 0 if and only if ± > ±n. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let (b¤;b¤
s) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Deﬁne
µ¤ = supfµ 2 [0;1] j b¤(µ) < b¤
sg;
where sup; = 0. To prove (13), consider any buyer i with type µi 2 [0;1].
Consider the case µi 2 (µ¤;1) ﬁrst. Then, b¤(µi) ¸ b¤
s. Buyer i’s equilibrium
payoﬀ is





Let us ﬁrst show that b¤(µi) · µi. Suppose not. Deﬁne ² = (b¤(µi)¡µi)=2 > 0
and µ00 = µi +². Then, for all µ 2 [µi;µ00], using that b¤ is weakly increasing,
b¤(µ) ¸ b¤(µi) ¸ µi + 2² ¸ µ00 + ²:
Therefore,




¡i 2 [µ00 + ²;b¤(µ00)]] > 0:
29Therefore, the bid bi = µi yields a higher expected payoﬀ than (35)—
contradiction. A similar argument shows b¤(µi) ¸ µi, hence b¤(µi) = µi.
Now consider the case µi < µ¤. Then, b¤(µi) < b¤
s because otherwise, by
Assumption 3, b¤(µ) ¸ b¤
s for all µ > µi, implying µ¤ · µi.
Using Assumption 3 again, b¤(µi) = 0.
To prove (14), consider the case µ¤ = 0 ﬁrst. By deﬁnition of µ¤, the
speculator wins with probability 0. Hence, (13) implies b¤
s = 0, showing
(14). Now consider the case µ¤ > 0.
Types µi < µ¤ prefer to bid 0 rather than make the bid µ¤. Therefore,
8µi < µ¤ : µi ¡ b¤
s · ± (µiQµ¤(µi) ¡ Pµ¤(µi)):
By (21) and (23), Pµ¤(¢) and Qµ¤(¢) are continuous at µ¤. Therefore,
µ¤ ¡ b¤




Similarly, if µ¤ < 1,
µ¤ ¡ b¤
s ¸ ± (µ¤ ¡ Pµ¤(µ¤));
which completes the proof of (14).
Formula (15) is straightforward from (14). Moreover, by (13), (14), and
(15), in a µ¤-equilibrium the speculator wins in period 1 with probability
Fn(µ¤), and her equilibrium payoﬀ equals
u¤
s
def = F(µ¤)n±M(µ¤): (36)
Because F and M are continuous, any payoﬀ u¤
s 2 [0;±M(1)] is obtained for
some µ¤ 2 [0;1].
Let us now construct the equilibria. Fix any µ¤ 2 (0;1). (The case µ¤ = 1
is similar; the case µ¤ = 0 was treated in Proposition 1.) Let period-1 bids
be deﬁned by (13), b¤(µ¤) = 0, b¤(1) = 1, and (14). Deﬁne on-path posterior
beliefs by (1). Oﬀ-path beliefs are deﬁned by (16). Given the posterior
beliefs, deﬁne the resale mechanisms by (4).
We have to show that (6) and (7) hold. To prove (7), suppose that the
buyers use the bid function b¤. If the speculator wins at a price p1 > µ¤ she
believes that p1 equals the highest value in the market. Therefore, her resale
revenue equals p1. Using this and deﬁnition (36), the speculator’s expected







0 if bs = 0;
u¤













if bs > µ¤;
where ˜ µ
(1)
¡i denotes the random variable for the highest value among buyers
other than i. Because u¤
s > 0 and ¡˜ µ
(1)







s(bs) = (0;µ¤] 3 b¤
s;
which completes the proof of (7).
To prove (6), we ﬁrst provide an upper bound for a winning buyer’s




This payoﬀ cannot exceed the total expected surplus available in the resale

























The next step is to show (*).
(*) For all buyers j and all bids bj ¸ 0, buyer j does not expect
to get a resale oﬀer from another buyer.
Consider any bid vector b¡j 2 [0;1]n that is possible if all buyers other
than j bid according to b¤, and the speculator bids b¤
s. Suppose that buyer





s;µi]. This implies ±v(i;b¡i;µi) · ±µi · µi by (37).
Therefore, it is optimal for buyer i to consume the good rather than oﬀering
it for resale, which completes the proof of (*).
For all b¡s 2 [0;1)n, and µi 2 [0;1], deﬁne
li(b¡s;µi) = Q
II
i (s;b¡s;0;µi)µi ¡ P
II
i (s;b¡s;0;µi):
31This is buyer i’s expected period-2 payoﬀ when the speculator wins in period
1, all buyers except i use the bid function b¤, and the buyers’ actual bids
are b¡s. Given the equilibrium construction,
li(b¡s;µi) =
(
µiQµ¤(µi) ¡ Pµ¤(µi) if b
(1)
¡s = 0;




















if bi ¸ b¤
s;
(39)
where we use the shorthand ui
def = u
II
i . We are now in a position to show that
low-value buyers bid 0,
8µi 2 [0;µ¤];bi > 0 : ui(0;µi) ¸ ui(bi;µi): (40)
For all bi 2 (0;b¤
s), we have ui(bi;µi) = 0 · ui(0;µi). For all bi ¸ µ¤,
ui(b¤






















Therefore, (40) follows once we show that
ui(b¤




s + maxfµi;±v¤g)F(µ¤)n¡1; (42)
where we use the shorthand v¤ = v(i;(0;:::;0;b¤
s);µi).
The envelope theorem or an explicit computation using Lemma 2, shows
that
Qµ¤(µi)µi ¡ Pµ¤(µi) =
Z µi
0
Qµ¤(ˆ µ)dˆ µ: (43)
Therefore,








i if µi ¸ r¤;
0 if µi < r¤;
(44)
32where r¤ def = r¤(µ¤) denotes the speculator’s optimal reserve price when she
oﬀers the good for resale after winning at price 0.
Because either µi · ±v¤ or µi ¸ ±v¤, formulas (42) and (44) reveal that
(41) follows once we show
µi ¡ b¤









i if µi ¸ r¤;
0 if µi < r¤:
(46)
Deﬁne
∆(µi) = µi ¡ b¤
s ¡ (µiQµ¤(µi) ¡ Pµ¤(µi)): (47)
By (14), ∆(µ¤) = 0. Moreover, using (43) we ﬁnd













Hence, ∆ is increasing and therefore ∆(µi) · ∆(µ¤) = 0, which implies (45).
To show (46), note that (14) implies
b¤
















i if µi ¸ r¤;
0 if µi < r¤












i if µi ¸ r¤;
0 if µi < r¤


































= ¡(1 ¡ ±)µ¤Fn¡1(µ¤)
· 0;
33which completes the proof of (40).
The ﬁnal step is showing that high-value buyers ﬁnd it optimal to bid
their value; i.e.,
8µi 2 [µ¤;1];bi ¸ 0 : ui(µi;µi) ¸ ui(bi;µi): (48)
The payoﬀ gain from any bid bi > µi is given by





















The payoﬀ gain from any bid bi 2 [b¤
s;µi) is given by



















The payoﬀ gain from any bid bi 2 (0;b¤
s) is given by




















The payoﬀ gain from bidding bi = b¤
s rather than bi = 0 equals ∆(µi)F(µ¤)n¡1,
where ∆(µi) is deﬁned as in (47). Because ∆(µ¤) = 0 and ∆ is increasing,
ui(b¤
s;µi) ¡ ui(0;µi) = ∆(µi)F(µ¤)n¡1 ¸ 0;
which completes the proof of (48). Condition (6) follows from (40) and (48).
QED
Proof of Proposition 4.
For all µ¤ 2 [0;1], let ¼(µ¤) denote the initial seller’s expected revenue in a
µ¤-equilibrium. In particular, ¼(0) is the expected revenue of the initial seller
34when every agent bids her value in period 1. We show that ¼(µ¤) > ¼(0) for
all µ¤ suﬃciently close to 0 and ¼(µ¤) < ¼(0) for all µ¤ suﬃciently close to
1.
Let ˜ µ(1) and ˜ µ(2) denote the highest and second highest value among the
buyers.
¼(µ¤) ¡ ¼(0) = Pr[˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)](b¤
s ¡ E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)])
+Pr[˜ µ(1) < µ¤](0 ¡ E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(1) < µ¤]): (49)
We have Pr[˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)] = nF(µ¤)n¡1(1¡F(µ¤)) ! 0 as µ¤ ! 1. Thus,
¼(µ¤) < ¼(0) for all µ¤ suﬃciently close to 1. Let us now consider the case
where µ¤ is close to 0.
Using (15), (49) implies
¼(µ¤) ¡ ¼(0) ¸ Pr[˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)](Pµ¤(µ¤) ¡ E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)])
¡Pr[˜ µ(1) < µ¤] E[˜ µ(2) j ˜ µ(1) < µ¤]: (50)
By Lemma 2 and r¤0(0) = 1=2,10
Pµ¤(µ¤)

































































Pr[˜ µ(2) < µ¤ < ˜ µ(1)]





10In the following, o(µ
l) stands for a function k(µ) with the property k(µ)=µ
l ! 0 as
µ ! 0.
35Taking (50), (51), (52), (53), and (54) together implies that ¼(µ¤) > ¼(0) if
µ¤ is small. QED
We now turn to the ﬁrst-price auction results. We will use the shorthand
ui = u
I
i throughout. Let b¤ be any bid function. For all b 2 [0;b¤(1)], deﬁne
Á(b) = supfµi 2 [0;1] j b¤(µi) < bg;
where sup; = 0.
Lemma 4 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then, b¤(µi) · µi for all µi 2 [0;1]. Moreover, Á(b) ¸ b.
Proof.
By Assumption 3, b¤(0) = 0. Now suppose that b¤(µi) > µi for some µi >
0. In particular, b¤(µi) > 0 and thus b¤(µi) wins with positive probability by
Assumption 3. Therefore, H(b¤(µi)) > 0 and Fn¡1(Á(b¤(µi))) > 0.
A deviation to the bid bi = µi is proﬁtable because
ui(µi;µi) ¡ ui(b¤(µi);µi)

















To prove the moreover-part, ﬁx b > 0 and consider any µi < b. Then
b¤(µi) · µi < b. Because µi is arbitrary, Á(b) ¸ b. QED
Lemma 5 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then 8b > 0 : Pr[˜ bs < b] > 0.
Proof. Let bs · 0 be maximal with the property Pr[˜ bs < bs] = 0.
Suppose that bs > 0.
Let u¤
s ¸ 0 denote the equilibrium expected payoﬀ for the speculator;
i.e., Pr[us(˜ bs) = u¤
s] = 1.
First consider the case H(bs) = 0 (i.e., no atom at bs). By assump-
tion, there exists a sequence (bm)m2I N such that bm ! bs as m ! 1, and
us(bm) = u¤
s and bm > bs for all m.
36Denote by b¤ the bid function used by the buyers. By Lemma 4, Pr[b¤(˜ µi) ·
bs] > 0. Deﬁne µ¤ = infb>bs Á(b). Because Pr[b¤(˜ µi) · bs] > 0, we have
µ¤ > 0. For all b = bm,
u¤
s = us(b) = F(Á(b))n (±M(Á(b)) ¡ b);
where M is deﬁned as in Proposition 5. Because u¤
s ¸ 0, we have M(Á(b)) ¸
bs=±. Thus, (3) implies








! b ! bs
µi ! µ¤
Pµ¤(µ¤):
Therefore, there exists ˆ b > bs and ˆ µ < µ¤ such that




Combining this with (55), we ﬁnd







Buyer i with value µi = ˆ µ and bid bi = b¤(ˆ µ) never wins. Moreover, if some
buyer j 6= i wins then bj = b¤(µj) > bs ¸ bi, implying µj > ˆ µ. Therefore,
Q
I
i(j;bj;µj) = 0 and P
I
i(j;bj;µj) = 0. Therefore,
ui(b¤(ˆ µ); ˆ µ) = ±E
·³







On the other hand, for all bi > bs,
ui(bi; ˆ µ) ¸ ±E
·³






+(ˆ µ ¡ bi)Pr[˜ µ
(1)
¡i < µ¤; ˜ bs · b1]:
37Therefore, for all bi 2 (bs;ˆ b),
ui(bi; ˆ µ) ¡ ui(b¤(ˆ µ); ˆ µ) ¸ ¡±E
·³






+(ˆ µ ¡ bi)Pr[˜ bs > ˜ b
(1)
¡s¡i; ˜ bs · bi]
¸ E
·³



























¡i <µ¤; ˜ bs·bi
¸
:
The last expression is strictly positive for all bi > bs that are suﬃciently
close to bs. This contradicts (8).
In the case H(bs) > 0 the proof is similar. One deﬁnes µ¤ = Á(bs) and
shows that the deviation b1 = bs is proﬁtable for some type ˆ µ < µ¤. QED






s ¸ 0 denote the equilibrium expected payoﬀ for the
speculator; i.e., Pr[us(˜ bs) = u¤
s] = 1. Suppose that u¤
s > 0.
We have H(0) = 0 because otherwise u¤
s = 0. By Lemma 5, there exists
a sequence (bm)m2I N such that bm ! 0 as m ! 1, and us(bm) = u¤
s and
bm > 0 for all m.
Deﬁne µ¤ = supfµi 2 [0;1] j b¤(µi) = 0g. For all b = bm,
u¤
s = us(b) ¸ F(µ¤)n (±M(Á(b)) ¡ b):
Because u¤
s > 0, we have µ¤ > 0 and M(Á(b)) ¸ u¤
s for all b = bm. Therefore,
M(µ¤) ¸ u¤
s. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5, this
implies the existence of ˆ b > 0 and ˆ µ < µ¤ such that





Buyer i with value µi = ˆ µ and bid bi = b¤(ˆ µ) = 0 never wins. In the same
manner as in the proof of Lemma 5, one obtains a contradiction by showing
that a deviation to a small positive bid bi > 0 is proﬁtable. QED
38Lemma 7 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then H is continuous on (0;1).
Proof. Suppose that there exists ˆ b > 0 where H(¢) is not continuous;
i.e., Pr[˜ bs = ˆ b] > 0.
Deﬁne µm = Á(ˆ b) ¡ 1=m for all m large enough that µm > 0. Let
b = limm!1 b¤(µm). We have b = ˆ b because otherwise Pr[b¤(˜ µi) 2 (b;ˆ b)] = 0
which would imply us((ˆ b + b)=2) > us(ˆ b).
Using (3) we ﬁnd PÁ(ˆ b)(Á(ˆ b)) ¸ M(Á(ˆ b))+´ ¸ ˆ b=±+´ because otherwise
us(ˆ b) < 0. By Lemma 2, the function PÁ(ˆ b) is continuous at Á(ˆ b) and thus
PÁ(ˆ b)(µm) > ˆ b=± + ´=2;
for all large m. Therefore, for large m,
ui(ˆ b;µm) ¡ ui(b¤(µm);µm)
¸ H(b¤(µm))Fn¡1(Á(b¤(µm)))(b¤(µm) ¡ˆ b) + Pr[˜ bs 2 (b¤(µm);ˆ b)](¡1)
+Pr[˜ bs = ˆ b]Fn¡1(Á(ˆ b))((1 ¡ ±)µm + (±PÁ(ˆ b)(µm) ¡ˆ b)):
Therefore,
lim inf
m!1u1(ˆ b;µm)¡u1(b1(µm);µm) ¸ Pr[˜ bs = ˆ b]Fn¡1(Á(ˆ b))(±PÁ(ˆ b)(µm)¡ˆ b)) > 0:
I.e., for large m type µm has a proﬁtable deviation. QED
Lemma 8 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then the bid function b¤ is continuous. Moreover, Á(b¤(µi)) = µi
for all µi 2 [0;1]. The function Á is strictly increasing.
Proof. Standard.
Lemma 9 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then b¤(µi) < µi for all µi 2 (0;1]. Moreover, Á(b) > b for all
b 2 (0;b¤(1)].
Proof. Suppose that b¤(µi) ¸ µi > 0. Then b¤(µi) > 0, implying H(b¤(µi)) >
0 by Lemma 5. Now Lemma 4 shows that b1(µ1) = µ1. Finally, a computa-
tion similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4 shows that a deviation to the
bid b1 = µ1=2 is proﬁtable—contradiction.
39The claim about Á now follows from Lemma 8. QED
For µ 2 (0;1] and b 2 I R, deﬁne






N(µ;b) if b > ±M(µ);
maxf±M0(µ);N(µ;b)g if b · ±M(µ):
(57)
For all b 2 (0;b¤(1)] where the derivative Á0(b) exists, deﬁne
R(b) = F(Á(b)) ¡ (n ¡ 1)f(Á(b))Á0(b)(Á(b) ¡ b); (58)
S(b) = F(Á(b))(Á(b) ¡ b ¡ ±(Á(b) ¡ PÁ(b)(Á(b))));
where PÁ(b)(Á(b)) denotes the expected payment of a bidder with value Á(b)




S(b) if b = ±M(Á(b));
0 if b > ±M(Á(b)):
(59)
(L is well-deﬁned because b = ±M(Á(b)) implies S(b) > 0 by (3)).
Lemma 10 Let (b¤;H) be an equilibrium outcome of the ﬁrst-price auction
with resale. Then Á is Lipschitz on [0;b¤(1)].
Moreover, b¤ is Lipschitz on [0;1], satisﬁes11
b¤0(µ) = K(µ;b¤(µ)) a.e. µ 2 (0;1); b¤(0) = 0; (60)
and is uniquely deﬁned by these conditions.
The distribution H is locally Lipschitz on (0;1], satisﬁes
h(b)
def = H0(b) = H(b)L(b) for a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)]; (61)
and is uniquely deﬁned by these conditions.
Proof. For all bi 2 (0;b¤(1)] and µi 2 [0;1],





11“a.e.” means “almost every, according to the Lebesgue measure.”
40Now consider bi;b0
i 2 (0;b¤(1)] with b0
i < bi, and µ0
i = Á(b0




















































































Now ﬁx some ci 2 (0;b¤(1)]. We write Ξ(ci) = 0 if
9» > 0 : Pr[˜ bs 2 (ci ¡ »;ci + »)] = 0;
and Ξ(ci) = 1 otherwise. By Lemma 6,
if Ξ(ci) = 1 then 9(cm);cm ! ci;cm 6= ci : ±M(Á(cm)) = cm: (64)
Therefore, by continuity of M and Á,
if Ξ(ci) = 1 then M(Á(ci)) = ci: (65)
First consider the case Ξ(ci) = 0. Then, H is constant in the neighborhood
N(ci) = (ci ¡ »;ci + ») \ (0;b¤(1)] of ci. In particular, H is Lipschitz in
N(ci). Moreover, (63) implies that
8ci;Ξ(ci) = 0;bi 2 N(ci);b0
i 2 N(ci);b0
i < bi : k1(bi;b0
i) ¸ 0: (66)
41Now consider the case Ξ(ci) = 1. Using (3) and (65), there exists ´ > 0 such
that for all bi;b0
i in some neighborhood of ci, and b0
i < bi,
k2(bi;b0
i) ¸ F(Á(bi))n¡1 ¡
Á(b0
i)(1 ¡ ±) + ±M(Á(b0






8ci;Ξ(ci) = 1 9N(ci) > 0 and a neighborhood N(ci) 3 ci :
8bi;b0
i 2 N(ci);b0
i < bi : k2(bi;b0
i) ¸ N(ci): (67)
Together with (63) and k1(bi;b0
i) · 1, this implies that H is Lipschitz in
N(ci). We therefore conclude that in either case, Ξ(ci) = 0 or Ξ(ci) = 1, the
function H is Lipschitz in a neighborhood of ci, proving that H is locally
Lipschitz in (0;1]. Therefore, H is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere on (0;1].
Note also that if Ξ(ci) = 1, formula (67) together with (63) implies that
(66) holds for some neighborhood N(ci) of ci. We conclude that
8bi 2 (0;b¤(1)];b0
i 2 (0;b¤(1)];b0
i < bi : k1(bi;b0
i) ¸ 0: (68)
Moreover, (68) implies




Note that for all bi;b0
i 2 (0;b¤(1)] with b0
i < bi, and µi = Á(bi),









































i) = F(Á(bi))n¡1 ¡




42Again ﬁx some ci 2 (0;b¤(1)].
First consider the case Ξ(ci) = 0. Then, (70) implies the existence of a
neighborhood N(ci) of ci such that
8bi 2 N(ci);b0
i 2 N(ci);b0
i < bi : l1(bi;b0
i) · 0:
Together with (68) this implies, for all bi 2 N(ci), that F(Á)n¡1 is diﬀeren-












Hence, Á is diﬀerentiable at bi 2 N(ci), and,











because ±M(Á(bi)) · bi for all bi, by Lemma 6.
Now consider the case Ξ(ci) = 1. By (64),
8ci; Ξ(ci) = 1; Á diﬀerentiable at ci : ±M0(Á(ci))Á0(ci) = 1: (73)




N(Á(ci);ci) if ±M(Á(ci)) < ci;
minf 1
N(Á(ci);ci); 1
±M0(Á(ci))g if ±M(Á(ci)) = ci;
(74)
by (69), (71), (72), and (73).
Next we show that Á and b¤ are Lipschitz continuous. By (68), F(Á)n¡1
is locally Lipschitz in (0;1], implying that Á is locally Lipschitz in (0;1].
Hence,




where Á0 is given almost everywhere by the right-hand side in (74).
The mapping bi 7! N(Á(bi);bi) is bounded above on [0;b¤(1)] because
N(Á(bi);bi) · (n ¡ 1)f(Á(bi))Á(bi)=F(Á(bi)) ! n ¡ 1 as bi ! 0. Moreover,
43M0 is bounded above on [0;1] by Lemma 3. Therefore, Á0 is bounded below
by a positive number. Hence, b¤ is Lipschitz on [0;1] by (75).
To see that Á is Lipschitz in a neighborhood of 0, we ﬁrst prove that
























m!1N(Á(bm);bm) = (n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ±M0(0)) > ±M0(0);
contradicting (77).
From (76) it follows that Á(b) = Á
I(b) for all b 2 [0;ˆ b], where Á
I denotes
the inverse of the no-resale equilibrium bid function b
I. It is well-known that
Á
I is Lipschitz in a neighborhood of 0.
Because b¤ is the inverse of Á, (60) follows from (74).
As for uniqueness of b¤, let b¤ and c¤ be two Lipschitz continuous func-
tions that satisfy (60). By deﬁnition of K, if b¤(µ) > c¤(µ) then K(µ;b¤(µ)) <
K(µ;c¤(µ)), for all µ 2 (0;1). Therefore, b¤ · c¤. The same argument shows
b¤ ¸ c¤.
To show that H satisﬁes (61), consider any b 2 (0;b¤(1)]. If Ξ[b] = 0 and
b = ±M(Á(b)), we have h(b) = 0 and, by (71),
R(b)
F(Á(b))
= 1 ¡ Á0(b)N(Á(b);b) = 0:
Hence, R(b) = 0 = h(b) = H(b)L(b), as was to be shown.
If Ξ[b] = 0 and b > ±M(Á(b)), we have h(b) = 0 = L(b) = H(b)L(b) by
deﬁnition of L.
Now consider the case Ξ[b] = 1. The function r¤ is continuous. Hence,




k2(b;b0) = S(b) = lim
c&b
l2(c;b) 8 b 2 (0;b¤(1)]: (78)
44Because Á is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere,
lim
b0%b
k1(b;b0) = R(b) = lim
c&b
l1(c;b) a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)]: (79)
From (63), (70), (78), and (79) we get (61).
It remains to be shown that H is unique. Firstly, the boundary condition
H(b¤(1)) = 1 holds by optimality of the speculator’s bid. Secondly, for any
² > 0, L is bounded above on [²;1] by (3). Therefore, applying the Picard-
Lindel¨ of Theorem to the diﬀerential equation (61) implies that H is unique
on [²;1]. As a distribution function, H is right-continuous at 0 and thus
uniquely determined at 0 as well. QED
Lemma 11 Let µ 2 (0;1) and consider a bounded and continuous function
ˆ N : [µ;1] £ I R ! I R. Deﬁne
ˆ K(µ;b) =





if b · 0:
(80)
Then the initial value problem
8µ 2 [µ;1) : f0
+(µ) = ˆ K(µ;f(µ)); f(µ) = 0; (81)
where f0
+ denotes the derivative from the right, has a Lipschitz continuous
solution f on [µ;1].





where B²(µ;b) denotes the ²-ball around (µ;b) according to any norm in
I R2, and co denotes the closed-convex-hull operator. Then, K is an up-
per hemi-continuous (or, in Aubin-Cellina’s (1984) terminology, upper semi-
continuous) correspondence, and its values are closed and convex. Moreover,
K is globally bounded. Therefore, the diﬀerential inclusion problem
f0(µ) 2 K(µ;f(µ)) a.e. µ 2 (µ;1); f(µ) = 0; (82)
has an absolutely continuous solution f (see Aubin-Cellina, 1984, Theorem
4, p.101). Note that, by (82), for a.e. µ 2 [µ;1]: if f(µ) < 0 then f0(µ) ¸ 0.
Hence,
8µ 2 [µ;1] : f(µ) ¸ 0: (83)
45We will now show that f satisﬁes
f0(µ) = ˆ K(µ;f(µ)) a.e. µ 2 (µ;1): (84)
First, consider µ 2 [µ;1] with f(µ) > 0, or f(µ) = 0 and ˆ N(µ;0) ¸ 0. Then,
K(µ;f(µ) = ˆ K(µ;f(µ)).
Second, consider µ 2 [µ;1] with f(µ) = 0 and ˆ N(µ;0) < 0. For a.e. such
µ, (82) implies f0(µ) · 0. On the other hand, f0(µ) ¸ 0 by (83). Therefore,
f0(µ) = 0 = ˆ K(µ;f(µ)), completing the proof of (84).
Because f is absolutely continuous,
8µ 2 [µ;1] : f(µ) =
Z µ
µ
ˆ K(ˆ µ;f(ˆ µ))dˆ µ: (85)
This together with the fact that ˆ K is bounded, implies that f is Lipschitz
continuous.
To show (81), it is suﬃcient that, for all µ 2 [µ;1),
∆(µ;µ0)
def = j ˆ K(µ0;f(µ0)) ¡ ˆ K(µ;f(µ))j !µ0&µ 0: (86)
If f(µ) > 0, or f(µ) = 0 and ˆ N(µ;0) > 0, we have ˆ K(µ;f(µ)) = ˆ N(µ;f(µ))
and ˆ K(µ0;f(µ0)) = ˆ N(µ0;f(µ0)) for µ0 > µ close to µ. Thus, (86) follows from
continuity of ˆ N.
Now consider the case where f(µ) = 0 and ˆ N(µ;0) = 0. Then, ˆ K(µ;f(µ)) =
0. Hence, (86) follows from
∆(µ;µ0) · j ˆ N(µ0;f(µ0))j !µ0&µ j ˆ N(µ;f(µ))j = 0:
Finally, consider the case where f(µ) = 0 and ˆ N(µ;0) < 0. Then, ˆ N(ˆ µ;f(ˆ µ)) <
0 for all ˆ µ 2 [µ;µ0], for all µ0 > µ close to µ. Therefore, ˆ K(ˆ µ;f(ˆ µ)) · 0 and
thus f(µ0) = 0 by (85) and (83). Therefore, ˆ K(µ0;f(µ0)) = 0, implying
∆(µ;µ0) = 0 and thus (86). QED
Lemma 12 The initial value problem
8µ 2 (0;1) : b¤0
+(µ) = K(µ;b¤(µ)); b¤(0) = 0; (87)
where b¤0
+ denotes the derivative from the right, has a solution b¤ on [0;1],
b¤ is Lipschitz continuous; (88)
8µ 2 (0;1] : b¤(µ) < µ; (89)
b¤ is strictly increasing; (90)
b¤ ¸ b
I; (91)
b¤ ¸ ±M; (92)
Á
def = b¤¡1 is Lipschitz continuous: (93)
46Proof. Deﬁne µ to be the smallest µ 2 [0;1] with b
I(µ) = ±M(µ) (let
µ = 1 if no such µ exists). Because b
I0(0) = (n ¡ 1)=n > ±M0(0) by (27), we
have µ > 0. Deﬁning b¤(µ) = b




I(0) = 0. Thus, (87) is satisﬁed, and it is standard from the theory of
ﬁrst-price auctions without resale that b¤ has the desired properties (88) to
(93) on [0;µ].





N(µ;b + ±M(µ)) ¡ ±M0(µ); if b 2 [0;µ ¡ ±M(µ)];
N(µ;µ) ¡ ±M0(µ); if b > µ ¡ ±M(µ);
N(µ;±M(µ)) ¡ ±M0(µ); if b < 0;
and deﬁne ˆ K as in (80). Then, Lemma 11 implies that there exists a Lips-
chitz continuous f such that (81) holds. By deﬁnition of ˆ K,
8µ 2 [µ;1] : f(µ) · µ ¡ ±M(µ); f(µ) ¸ 0:
Therefore, b¤(µ)
def = f(µ) + ±M(µ), µ 2 [µ;1], yields a Lipschitz continuous
solution for (87).
To prove (89), suppose that b¤(µ) ¸ µ for some µ > µ. Let ˆ µ be minimal
with that property. Then, b¤(ˆ µ) = ˆ µ > ±M(ˆ µ) and thus b¤ is diﬀerentiable
at ˆ µ and b¤0(ˆ µ) = 0. Hence, b¤(µ) > µ for µ < ˆ µ, when µ is close to ˆ µ, a
contradiction.
For all µ ¸ µ,
b¤0
+(µ) = K(µ;b¤(µ)) ¸ N(µ;b¤(µ)) > 0
by (89). This implies (90). It also implies that Á is Lipschitz on [b¤(µ);b¤(1)].
I.e., (93) follows.
Inequality (91) follows from b
I0(µ) = N(µ;b
I(µ)), for all µ 2 (0;1). In-
equality (92) is immediate from the deﬁnition of K. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
Uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Lemma 10.
To prove equilibrium existence, deﬁne b¤ as a solution to (87) and deﬁne
Á = b¤¡1. Inequality then (17) follows from (91) and (92). The next step is
to construct H. For any given ² > 0, (3) implies that
8b 2 [²;b¤(1)] : if b = ±M(Á(b))
then ±PÁ(b)(Á(b)) ¸ b + ±´(Á(²)): (94)




R(b) ¸ 0 a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)];; (95)
where R is deﬁned as in (58). Deﬁne L as in (59). From (95) and (94) it
follows that L is a nonnegative function and is bounded above on any given




bs L(b) db: (96)
For every ² > 0, the function H is Lipschitz on [²;1] because L is bounded
above on [²;1]. Moreover, the limit H(0) = limbs&0 H(bs) exists because
L is non-negative. Also because L is non-negative, H is weakly increasing.
Therefore, H is a distribution function. Diﬀerentiating (96) yields (61).
Having constructed (b¤;H), deﬁne posterior beliefs and resale mecha-
nisms by (2) and (5). We have to show that (8) and (9) hold.
To show (8), consider any deviating bid bi 2 (b¤(µi);b¤(1)] of a buyer
with type µi 2 (0;1], and suppose the buyer oﬀers the good for resale upon
winning. (The other cases, where the buyer consumes the good upon win-
ning or deviates to a bid bi 2 (0;b¤(µi)), are similar. By continuity of ui,
type µi = 0 has no incentive to deviate either.)
We obtain an upper bound ui(bi;µi) for buyer i’s payoﬀ by assuming she
gets the entire surplus that is available in the resale market,
ui(bi;µi) = H(bi)
Ã
F(Á(bi))n¡1(±µi ¡ bi) + ±
Z Á(bi)
µi








def = µiQÁ(bs)(µi) ¡ PÁ(bs)(µi):










¡±UÁ(bi)(µi) + ±µi ¡ bi + ±
Z Á(bi)
µi












¡±UÁ(bi)(µi) + ±µi ¡ bi + ±
Z Á(bi)
µi





This together with (95) implies
if L(bi) = 0 then
@ui
@bi
(bi;µi) · 0: (97)
From now on suppose that L(bi) > 0 and hence bi = ±M(Á(bi)). Plugging




















if L(bi) > 0 then
@ui
@bi
(bi;µi) · 0; (98)
49because
Á(bi) ¡ bi ¡ ±(Á(bi) ¡ PÁ(bi)(Á(bi)))
¡
Ã
¡±UÁ(bi)(µi) + ±µi ¡ bi + ±
Z Á(bi)
µi











ˆ µ ¡ µi
Fn¡1(Á(bi))
dFn¡1(ˆ µ)





dˆ µ ¡ ±
Z Á(bi)
µi
ˆ µ ¡ µi
Fn¡1(Á(bi))
dFn¡1(ˆ µ)










= (1 ¡ ±)Á(bi) ¸ 0:
Because Á and H are locally Lipschitz continuous on (0;b¤(1)], the mapping
bi 7! ui(bi;µi) has the same property and can thus be written as the integral
over its derivative. Therefore, using ui(b¤(µi);µi) = ui(b¤(µi);µi), (97) and
(98),







Hence, no type µi > 0 has an incentive to deviate, which completes the proof
of (8).
To complete the equilibrium existence proof, we have to show (9). From
(17) it follows that bs ¸ ±M(Á(bs)), and thus us(bs) · 0, for all bs 2
(0;b¤(1)]. It remains to be shown that
Pr[us(˜ bs) < 0] = 0:
Consider the event us(˜ bs) < 0. Then, b¤(Á(˜ bs)) > ±M(Á(˜ bs)) and thus







thereby completing the equilibrium existence proof.
50Finally, we prove equivalence of (18) to (20). First, suppose that H(0) =
1. Then L(b) = 0 for a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)]. Therefore, by deﬁnition of L,
b > ±M(Á(b)) or R(b) = 0 a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)]: (99)
By deﬁnition of K, inequality b > ±M(Á(b)) implies
b¤0
+(Á(b)) = N(Á(b);b¤(Á(b))):
Together with (99) this yields
F(Á(b)) ¡ (n ¡ 1)f(Á(b))Á0(b)(Á(b) ¡ b) = 0 a.e. b 2 (0;b¤(1)]:
The unique solution to this diﬀerential equation with boundary condition
Á(0) = 0 is the inverse of b
I. Therefore, b¤ = b
I.
Second, suppose that b¤ = b
I. Then, (17) implies ±M(µ) · b
I(µ) for all
µ 2 [0;1].
Third, suppose that ±M(µ) · b
I(µ) for all µ 2 [0;1]. Then, (17) implies
b¤ = b
I for all µ 2 [0;1]. Therefore, L(b) = 0 for all b 2 (0;b¤(1)], by
deﬁnition of b
I. Hence, H(0) = 1. QED
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